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ABSTRACT
In December 2005, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") re-
sponded to the HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical crisis in the least-
developed world by voting to make the first permanent amend-
ment to the WTO Agreements since their original negotiation dur-
ing the Uruguay Round. New Article 31bis will amend the TRIPS
Agreement to permit compulsory manufacturing licenses in order
to facilitate supply of needed pharmaceuticals to those countries
lacking the technological capacity to produce these drugs them-
selves. The amendment reflects a substantial shift in the essential
TRIPS bargain, constituting a significant "give-back" to those de-
veloping countries that specialize in the generic production of
pharmaceuticals. To date, however, there has been no significant
utilization of this facility (which was provisionally established in
August 2003). Rather, patent holders have determined - perhaps
under the threat of these newly authorized compulsory licenses- to
supply these markets directly with HIV/AIDS drugs at prices
much lower than those prevailing in developed country markets.
As a condition of doing so, both the pharmaceutical industry and
those WTO members that champion their interests have sought
and obtained limitations on the parallel trade of drugs subject to
differential pricing. This shift away from TRIPS' prior neutrality
on parallel trade may well spill over into additional areas beyond
the particular context in which the amendment developed.
We make the following observations:
TRIPS was previously neutral on the permissibility of parallel
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trade. Until now, WTO members were free to either permit or
prohibit the import and sale of intellectual property ("IP")-covered
goods that had been placed into commerce in foreign markets.
That is, IP-right holders may or may not be provided with an ancil-
lary right to block the importation and sale of "grey-market"
goods.
Parallel trade has not been a solution to assuring the supply of
needed drugs to AIDS-stricken regions of the least-developed
world. Quite simply, there has not been an adequate source-of-
supply at prices that the afflicted least-developed countries
("LDCs") are capable of paying.
Compulsory licensing now has a clear legal basis as a result of
the TRIPS amendment (and the provisional rule in place since Au-
gust 2003), yet virtually no countries have resorted to compulsory
licensing.
HIV/AIDS drug prices in LDC markets have fallen signifi-
cantly, which suggests that pharmaceutical manufacturers have de-
termined to supply LDC markets directly, instead of permitting
LDC demand to be met by generic producers utilizing the
amended TRIPS rules on compulsory licensing. Their determina-
tion to do so may have been motivated, at least in part, by the
threat of compulsory licenses.
Both the WTO community and the pharmaceutical industry
have embraced a policy of differential prices: high prices in devel-
oped markets and dramatically lower prices in LDC markets.
There has also been significant differentiation in products sup-
plied.
Effective controls on parallel trade are necessary to attain effec-
tive differential pricing. Without limits, low-priced drugs supplied
to LDC markets would flow back, by operation of arbitrageurs,
into high priced markets. This would undercut the economic re-
turns in the high priced markets and starve LDCs of their supply.
Thus, at least within the drug sector, TRIPS formal neutrality as
applied to parallel trade cannot stand.
The European Union ("EU") and the United States have non-IP
restrictions that sharply reduce the likelihood of parallel trade in
pharmaceuticals.
The observed positional shift in TRIPS from "neutrality" on
parallel trade to opposition may well spill over from the
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals context into a larger rethinking of the
appropriateness of IP-holders engaging in price discrimination.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The December 2005 amendment' of the TRIPS Agreement 2 and
the debate among the WTO members that led to the amendment, at
the very least, constitute a significant shift in TRIPS' declared "neu-
trality" as to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights with re-
spect to pharmaceuticals. TRIPS now rejects exhaustion in this
context. The political accord struck on the provision of patented
pharmaceuticals to WTO members suffering public health emer-
gencies will necessarily require price discrimination in order to be
effective. While the amendment facilitates the issuance of compul-
sory licenses, the emerging reality is that the threat of compulsory
licenses has helped persuade IP holders to provide needed phar-
maceuticals at low prices. The solution is one of differential
prices-that is, price discrimination. Low prices should be set in
the LDCs facing the AIDS crisis while high prices should be main-
tained in developed markets in order to underwrite the cost of de-
veloping these drugs.3 The segmentation of these national markets
should be implemented through a variety of techniques that impli-
cate various areas of WTO law, including IP-based import exclu-
sions and other exclusions.
The WTO regime has demonstrated a strange ambivalence to-
wards market segmentation and the use of price discrimination.
On the one hand, a world of free trade, established through the
1 See WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641
(Dec. 6, 2005) (amending TRIPS by inserting a new Article 31bis after Article 31 of
TRIPS, and inserting the Annex after Article 73 of TRIPS). New Article 31bis will
make permanent the waiver that had been established with respect to article 31(f)
of TRIPS. This new rule will permit compulsory manufacturing licenses in third
countries in order to service the afflicted markets that lack the capacity to locally
manufacture pharmaceuticals.
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
3 One can imagine other solutions. The pharmaceutical industry at one time
advanced the solution of global high prices, subsidized through financial assis-
tance offered by wealthy states to those nations challenged by the AIDS pan-
demic. Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs Con-
vened by the World Health Organization and World Trade Organization
Secretariats, Apr. 8-11, 2001, Report, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
hq/2001/a73725.pdf. Such a solution would have certainly resulted in more
revenue, and hence higher return on investment, for the pharmaceutical compa-
nies. It would also have constituted a wealth transfer from prosperous states to
profitable business enterprises with the added "feel-good" benefit of facilitating
the provision of needed drugs.
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eradication of trade barriers, anticipates the establishment of single
global prices for most goods. The WTO's permissive stance to-
wards anti-dumping laws may be read to evidence a policy prefer-
ence against price discrimination between national markets. Note
that antidumping law rejects price discrimination asymmetrically;
only price discrimination involving lower prices in the export mar-
ket is disciplined. Presumably, lower prices in the home market
may be addressed by internal competition law (antitrust law) pro-
visions on price discrimination, such as the U.S. Robinson-Patman
Act.4 Yet the WTO agreements, and particularly the TRIPS Agree-
ment, countenance the maintenance of trade restrictions using in-
tellectual property rights.
Holders of intellectual property rights can often effectively iso-
late national markets and foster price discrimination. By exercising
the exclusive right to sell, an IP-holder can effectively eliminate in-
tra-brand competition sourced in foreign markets where lower
prices prevail, thus maintaining price discrimination. Price dis-
crimination maximizes return to the IP-holder, as it permits more
effective capture of consumer surplus in the national markets
where demand is strong. The resulting market segmentation has
economic, political, and social consequences. This phenomenon
was addressed in European Union jurisprudence involving the
EU's internal markets. In a series of cases, the European Court of
Justice struck down the exercise of national IP rights that had the
effect of isolating national territories and so permitting price dis-
crimination within the EU's single market.
5
TRIPS has, until recently, displayed a "neutral" position with
respect to price discrimination effected by the use of intellectual
property rights. Article 6 famously provides that "nothing in...
[the TRIPS] Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the ex-
haustion of intellectual property rights." 6 This has been under-
stood as a permissive policy with respect to import exclusion of IP-
protected goods: each WTO member may decide for itself (as a
matter of its internal IP law) whether a holder of an IP right may
block the sale or importation of an IP-protected good that was pro-
duced by or under the authority of that IP right holder. Where no
such right to block imports is recognized, the WTO member is said
to practice "exhaustion." The IP rights established under national
4 Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
5 See discussion infra Section 2.2.
6 TRIPS art. 6.
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law are "exhausted" by the IP holder's placing of the goods onto
their market of origin. Where an IP-holder is permitted to block
the importation of such goods, the IP right is said to not be "ex-
hausted" by its prior commercialization in another territory. Of
course, all states practice "exhaustion" with respect to original
sales made within their respective territories; absent an express
contractual undertaking, IP-holders cannot restrict the right of a
vendee to sell a good to another.
TRIPS does grant an IP-holder a general right to prevent im-
portation of goods embodying that IP right. For example, TRIPS
Article 28(1)(a) makes explicit that a patent shall confer on its
owner the exclusive right to prevent third parties lacking the
owner's consent from importing that product for the purpose of
"making, using, offering for sale, [or] selling" it. A footnote to Ar-
ticle 28 reminds the reader that the import exclusion right "is sub-
ject to the provisions of Article 6." This in turn clarifies that an ex-
plicit import exclusion right need not apply to goods originally
placed in commerce in other states. That is, despite recurring ar-
guments to the contrary 7, Article 28 did not settle, as a matter of
WTO law, the parallel trade debate by excluding the possibility of
national adoption of international exhaustion.8
The HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical controversy has altered the
balance struck in TRIPS. The debate has centered around the le-
gitimacy under TRIPS of compulsory manufacturing licenses in
states with vibrant generic drugs sectors (such as Brazil and India)
that would be used to service those WTO members lacking the
technological and structural capacities to produce the needed
drugs themselves. The effective resolution of that dispute pre-
sumes the maintenance of effective price discrimination.
7 The United States has at times asserted that the import exclusion right
mandated by TRIPS article 28(1)(a) means that patent holders must have the right
to block parallel trade. TRIPS art. 28. The U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2000), grants U.S. patent holders a right to block infringing imports: "[W]hoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." Id. (emphasis added). Jazz
Photo holds that the right to block imports extends to parallel trade. See discus-
sion infra Section 2.3.
8 See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Han-
delsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799 (depicting the European Court of Jus-
tice's examination of EU trademark law and their conclusion that international
exhaustion was a mandatory exclusion).
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Compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs, including those for
export, are now clearly permitted by TRIPS. Yet there has been no
significant movement towards the use of compulsory licenses since
the provisional adoption of this new rule just prior to the Cancim
ministerial in August 2003. During this same period, the cost of
anti-AIDS treatment in many LDCs has fallen precipitously. While
the existence of a link is not clear from doubt, it may be fair to
surmise that the potential compulsory licenses have posed a suffi-
ciently credible threat that has induced pharmaceutical patentees
to provide drugs at much lower prices than they had earlier been
disposed to offer-and at lower prices than these same drugs
command in other markets.9
The willingness of the pharmaceutical industry to distribute
drugs at low cost, however, depends on its confidence that these
drugs will not filter back into high priced markets. This article will
discuss the embrace of differential pricing-or price discrimina-
tion- by TRIPS in the pharmaceutical sector and its possible exten-
sion to other goods embodying IP rights. A world of price dis-
crimination featuring segmented national markets is hardly the
original vision of the founders of the GATT or the WTO.
1.1. The HIV/AIDS Crisis and the December 2005 TRIPS Amendment
The AIDS pandemic was already in full crisis by the time of the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Notwithstanding this, ad-
vanced countries (led by the United States) obtained the commit-
ment of the eventual WTO membership to mandate universal pat-
ent protection "without regard to [the] field of technology." 10 This
last provision was included to make clear that WTO members
could not categorically exclude pharmaceuticals from patent pro-
tection (as many countries had in fact done prior to the establish-
ment of the WTO). The universal extension of IP protection and its
application to pharmaceuticals represented a negotiating victory
for the North. In turn, the developing world presumably won
compensating access to Northern textile and agriculture markets as
9 There may be other factors in play which account for or contribute to the
observed fall in prices. Patented anti-AIDS drugs compete with patent-free ge-
neric alternatives. JULIAN MORRIS ET AL., IDEAL MATrER: GLOBALISATION AND THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE 7 (2002).
10 See, e.g., TRIPS art. 27; Anthony Prenol, WTO Panel Rules on Regulatory Re-
view and Stockpiling Exceptions in Patent Act, BLAKES INTELL. PROP. BULL.,
July/Aug. 2000, http://www.blakes.com/english/publications/brip/arti-
cle.asp?A ID=120&DB=blakesProperty.
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part of the Uruguay Round's "grand bargain." Moreover, the
TRIPS mandate to concede patent rights was subject to phase-ins
for countries classified as developing and least-developed.
TRIPS requires that all WTO members provide patent protec-
tion for a minimum of twenty-years, subject to the phase-ins for
developing and least-developed countries. Compulsory licensing
is permitted by TRIPS, but is subject to significant limitations. A
WTO member may authorize a compulsory license (a license to a
third-party to produce or market a patented product such as a
pharmaceutical without the consent of the patent holder) according
to the terms of TRIPS Article 31. Under ordinary conditions, the
WTO member is required to first negotiate with the patent holder
for the provision of the patented product on commercial terms.11 A
compulsory license may issue only upon the failure of such nego-
tiations unless there is a state of emergency -in which case the re-
quirement of prior negotiation is suspended. The patent holder is
entitled to compensation in the event of a compulsory license. The
scope and the duration of the license shall be limited to the pur-
pose for which it was authorized.
The scheme provided in TRIPS Article 31 is also flawed with
regard to a number of unclear notions, which have created tensions
regarding when and how compulsory licensing may be applied.
For example, it is unclear:
(1) when a situation of national emergency may be invoked;
(2) how much effort must be exerted to reach a voluntary
agreement with the patent holder before a failure has been estab-
lished;
(3) what royalty compensation must be awarded to the rights-
holder; and
(4) whether LDCs with no production capacity may rely on
importation to supply their markets.
11 TRIPS starts with the assumption that the importing country shall first ap-
proach the rights-holder. Only if an agreement cannot be reached on commer-
cially reasonable terms may the importer approach others. See, e.g., Stephanie A.
Barbosa, Note, Implementation of the Doha Declaration: Its Impact on American Phar-
maceuticals, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 205, 258 (2005) (suggesting that there are reasons to al-
low the rights-holder a second bite at the apple; specifically, once the importer has
made a tentative agreement with a third party, the rights-holder could be offered
a right to supply on the same terms and conditions offered by the third party). It
would not only be fair to the rights-holder, but it may also be in the interest of the
buyer to have access to an approved product, which is produced according to es-
tablished high safety standards, rather than a product that is merely less expen-
sive.
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Under TRIPS, the resolution of many of these uncertainties is in
the hands of the importing country. As long as it follows the
TRIPS procedure, the importing country can make the final deter-
mination itself.12
There can be little doubt that least-developed and developing
countries most affected by epidemic diseases are in an emergency
situation under TRIPS Article 31 and that they are fully entitled to
use the system of compulsory licensing.1 3 That, however, has not
been sufficient to permit a supply of needed pharmaceuticals. A
real problem is that most such countries lack the know-how, edu-
cation and technology to produce the essential medicines re-
quired.14 In addition, national infrastructures are oftentimes insuf-
12 But see Press Release, World Trade Org. News, The General Council Chair-
person's statement (Aug. 30, 2003) ("Any Member may bring any matter related
to the interpretation or implementation of the Decision... to the TRIPS Council
for expeditious review, with a view to take appropriate action.") available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news03-e/trips-stat_28aug03_e.htm
[hereinafter General Council Chairperson's Statement]; Barbosa, supra note 11, at
249 (arguing that a special WTO committee should be set up to oversee the pro-
posed action in order to establish that the proposed activity is optimal and that no
equally good generic alternatives exist). The Chairperson's statement may reduce
the control of the importing state.
13 The European Communities ("EC") and their Member States circulated a
position paper to WTO members on this subject. Section 12 states:
The view of the EC and their member States is that the absence of any
explicit reference to public health in Article 31 does not prevent WTO
Members from invoking public health concerns. Article 7 ('Objectives')
refers to 'social and economic welfare' as an objective of the Agreement
while Article 8 ('Principles') allows Members to take measures necessary
to protect public health, provided such measures are consistent with the
provisions of the Agreement. Although Articles 7 and 8 were not drafted
as general exception clauses, they are important for interpreting other
provisions of the Agreement, including where measures are taken by
Members to meet health objectives.
Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States to the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (June 12, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/trips-e/paper eu-w280
e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Communication].
14 A different stance is presented in a position paper submitted to the TRIPS
Council by the Developing Country Group ("DCG"). Developing Country
Group, TRIPS and Public Health (June 19, 2001) [hereinafter DCG position paper],
available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/trips-e/paper -develop-
w296_e.htm. The DCG, consisting of the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, places the pro-
tection and enforcement of IP rights in the context of the interests of society. Id.
The group claims that "[1local manufacturing of pharmaceutical products also en-
courages sustainable access to medications by insulating the price of patented
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ficient to distribute medicines to larger groups of the population,
even when they have access to the essential drugs. Transfer of
know-how and technology from the industrialized world is re-
quired, but such development is long-term and the needs are im-
mediate. The shortcomings of TRIPS were obvious. In 2001, WTO
members recognized the gravity of the health problems affecting
many developing and least-developed countries at the Ministerial
Conference meeting in Doha. The Doha Declaration affirmed that
the TRIPS Agreement "can and should be interpreted in a manner
supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all." i5 Thus, WTO
members could both freely grant compulsory licenses and decide
on the grounds for their issue. In order to provide relief for coun-
tries with no production capacity in the pharmaceutical sector,
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration instructed the Council for
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution before the end of 2002.16
medicines against currency devaluations, as well as supporting the development
of local expertise, which is vital in addressing local needs." Id. In other words,
the DCG takes the stance that the mere recognition of IP rights encourages trans-
fer of technology and know-how by encouraging domestic production of pharma-
ceutical products. Accordingly, the group supports compulsory licensing as a
means of ensuring transfer and dissemination of technology in the case of market
failure. Id.
The DCG also reads Article 8.2 of TRIPS, which prevents the abuse of IP rights
and practices that unreasonably restrict or negatively impact trade and technol-
ogy transfer, as permitting developing countries to take action where patent rights
are exercised in ways that conflict with public health policies. Such instances in-
clude patent holders pricing drugs excessively beyond reasonable profit margins,
and therefore effectively stymieing access to medication, or patent holders refus-
ing to provide products in sufficient amounts. Id.
15 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
16 See id. ("We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufac-
turing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making ef-
fective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement."). A subsequent
WHO/WTO report concluded that this "landmark" declaration "demonstrates
that a rules-based trading system is compatible with public health interests. The
careful and systematic attention which WTO Members afforded to fine-tuning the
balance that needs to be found in the intellectual property system is indicative of
the prominence accorded to public health on the international trade agenda."
World Health Organization & the World Trade Organization, WTO Agreements
and Public Health: A Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat 111 (2002),
available at http:/ / www.who.int/media/homepage/en/who-wto-e.pdf [herein-
after WTO Study].
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In spite of the clear language of the Doha Declaration, 17 finding
a solution to secure access to medicines turned out to be a difficult
task.'8 Countries were acting in their own self-interest either be-
cause they felt essential values were at stake (as with the United
States)19 or because they saw opportunities for domestic industry
to expand into new fields (India and Brazil).20 The U.S. position
was to limit the types of products that would be available for com-
pulsory licensing to medicines that combat epidemic diseases and
to reduce the number of countries that would be eligible as both
importers and exporters of these products.21 The European Union
advanced a compromise solution.22 The December 2002 deadline
passed without any agreement being reached.23 It was not until
17 The Doha Declaration is an interpretative statement by the organization. It
does not amend or change the TRIPS Agreement, but still serves as a persuasive
authority.
18 See Hans Henrik Lidgard, Internationell handel med patentskyddade ldkemedel,
NORDISK IMMATERIELLT RATTSSKYDD [N.I.R.] 2004:1 (Nor.).
19 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND AccEss TO
MEDICINES: HOW DID WE GET HERE?, http://www.ec.europa.eu/
trade/issues/global/medecine/argu-en.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2006) (accusing
the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland on the grounds that
"their unambitious draft underscores their reluctance to do anything substantial
and serious at [this] stage").
20 See generally Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Offers Compromise to Break
TRIPs/Medicines Deadlock in VTO, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 339 (2003) (propos-
ing to set new disciplines on domestic manufacturing capacity, and to defer to the
WHO's decision-making authority on the issue of whether a country qualifies for
the use of new compulsory licensing rules).
21 See Second Communication from the United States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the Trade Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/358 (July 9, 2002),
("[I]t currently would be inconsistent with Article 31(f) [regarding patented
pharmaceutical products] for that WTO Member to grant a compulsory licence to
its manufacturer to produce the drug solely for export to the country that has in-
sufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.").
22 See TRIPS Communication, supra note 13 (indicating that another possible
interpretation of the Agreement is to allow a Member to issue a compulsory li-
cence to a manufacturer in another country (provided the government of that
other country recognized the licence) and the goods manufactured were exported
to the country granting the licence). The EU made the observation "that it is far
from certain whether such a 'permissive' reading of the Agreement would stand
scrutiny by a panel or the Appellate Body." Id. 13.
23 See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, E.C. Trade Comm'r, Address to the Association of
Pharmaceutical Industry Managers: International Trade in Drugs-It's Role in
Equitable Development (Mar. 21, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/
commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches-articles/splal62 en.htm (last visited Dec.
7, 2006) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Address] (singling out the United States as
the sole country refusing to join the consensus on the grounds that it wanted to
restrict the mechanism to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis).
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August 30, 2003, that the TRIPS Council was finally able to reach a
decision 24 (the "August 30 Agreement") shortly before the Cancin
Ministerial Conference. 25 The August 30 Agreement is somewhat
of a compromise. The Agreement itself only refers to pharmaceuti-
cal products needed to address a public health problem with a ref-
erence to the Doha Declaration. 26 The statement of the chairper-
son,2 7 which is attached to the decision, adds that the decision
should be used in good faith to protect public health and should
not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy ob-
jectives. It applies not only to formulated pharmaceuticals pro-
duced and supplied under the system, but also to active ingredi-
ents and to finished products produced using such active
ingredients. The right to use compulsory licensing is not limited to
least-developed countries, but can be invoked by others as well.
The difference is that an emergency situation is presumed in the
least-developed countries, whereas others have to show that such
problems exist.
The chairperson's statement further clarifies that a number of
WTO Members will not avail themselves of the opportunity to im-
port products under compulsory licensing or will only do it in
emergency situations. As the statement is appended to the deci-
sion, it carries at best interpretive weight -the question remains as
to how much.28
24 See generally Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept.
2, 2003), http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-searchResult.asp [hereinafter August
30th Agreement] (detailing the obligations and process for compulsory licensing of
pharmaceutical products by export countries).
25 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2003,
WT/MIN(03)/20 (2003) (memorializing the progress made toward compliance
with the mandates of the Doha Declaration).
26 See August 30th Agreement, supra note 24, 1 ("' [P]harmaceutical product'
means any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented proc-
ess, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems as
recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration.").
27 See Pharmaceutical Address, supra note 23 ("[O]ur goal is to provide cut-
price drugs to the developing countries, not to undermine prices on the European
markets.").
28 See Markus Nolff, Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health and the Decision of the WTO Regarding Its Implementation: An "Ex-
peditious Solution"?, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 291, 300 n.22 (2004) (indi-
cating that the chairman's statement does not clarify whether any agreement
made among the parties to the Vienna Convention would affect "the context for
the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty").
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Under the August 30 Agreement, the requirement of domestic
production in TRIPS Article 31(f) is waived on the following condi-
tions:
The importing country must make an application to the
WTO;
The compulsory license granted in the exporting country
shall also be reported to the WTO and be limited to the
amount necessary to meet the needs of the importing coun-
try;
Products shall furthermore be distinguishable through spe-
cific labelling and marking and information must be pub-
lished on the internet. 29
Accordingly, a combined reading of TRIPS Article 31 and the
August 30 Agreement sets out a number of steps that must be car-
ried out before a compulsory license may be granted. First, nego-
tiations for a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms
must have failed. Only then can an application for a compulsory
license be introduced to the WTO. In its application, the importing
country must demonstrate an emergency situation and its own in-
ability to produce the product locally. Also, the potential exporter
must also seek a voluntary license and must obtain an approval
from its national government. Royalties must be established and a
distinguishable product produced and approved. These proce-
dures must be repeated for each export transaction. Each step does
not in itself present an insurmountable hurdle - but cumulatively
they constitute a significant burden.30
The interests of the rights-holder shall be secured in the proc-
ess. In line with the general requirements for compulsory licensing
provided in TRIPS Article 30, the rights-holder shall receive ade-
29 See August 30th Agreement, supra note 24, 2. In an attachment to the
statement made by the chair a "best practices guideline" for distinguishing prod-
ucts is initiated. The suggestive list also refers to the practice of prohibiting reex-
portation. See the General Council Chairperson's Statement, supra note 12. The
statement is regarded as an integral part of the Agreement and it specifies that the
Agreement must not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy
objectives and that several developed countries have opted out of benefiting from
the Agreement as importers.
30 See Anthony P. Valach, Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent Holders and
Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
156, 168 (2005).
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quate compensation, but only from the country of exportation. In
addition, it is expected that the importing country shall take rea-
sonable measures to prevent trade diversion of the products and
that other WTO Members shall take measures to prevent importa-
tion of such products.
In the August 30 Agreement it was stipulated that the agree-
ment was provisional and should be replaced by an amendment of
TRIPS. This revision was supposed to be undertaken within a six
month period. Unfortunately, the matter was not addressed dur-
ing the unsuccessful Canctin discussions that followed,31 which
was probably just as well.
The TRIPS Council held regular meetings on the issue. On
June 16, 2004 the Chair reported that positions had not evolved
and that work continued with the aim of having a proposal for the
meeting in March 2005.32 A special problem, which may have con-
tributed to the delay, is how developing countries can secure ac-
cess to technology and confidential data supplied by the rights-
holder to national authorities. If TRIPS only grants protection to
new chemical entities, there should be no need to protect a new dos-
age form or new use of a known product. Article 39.3 of TRIPS
permits a national competent authority to rely on data in its pos-
session to assess further applications relating to the same drug,
since this would not imply any "unfair commercial use." This
right could, in principle, be extended to support developing coun-
tries.
In December 2005, the WTO membership determined to make
the August 30 Agreement permanent by amending TRIPS. The
mere fact of amendment is a seismic event fraught with risk 33- as
other political bargains could unravel as well. Moreover, definitive
adoption of new TRIPS Article 31bis requires ratification in na-
tional legislatures throughout the WTO membership that may well
provide opportunity for domestic interests with these and other
WTO-related agendas to intervene.34 All that said, ratification and
31 See Cancin's Charming Outcome, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 13.
32 TRIPS Council, Regular Meeting of 16 June 2004.
33 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.
X, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1144, 1149-51 (1994) (establishing the WTO amendment
process).
34 Article 31bis has been submitted to the WTO membership for acceptance.
Adoption requires acceptance by two-thirds majority of the WTO membership.
The provisional deadline for acceptance is December 1, 2007.
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eventual incorporation of the new Article 31bis into TRIPS is ex-
pected.
2. PATENT-BASED LIMITS ON PARALLEL TRADE
2.1. Exhaustion
The high cost of medicines is more a consequence of high re-
search and development costs than actual production and distribu-
tion costs. A new chemical entity appears on average to require an
investment far exceeding $100 million 35 and requires more than ten
years of systematic development and testing before the final prod-
uct can be commercialized.
Patent protection, which assures a period of exclusivity, is one
essential incentive to the research-based pharmaceutical sector,3 6 as
The procedure for amending TRIPS is set forth in Article X of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The Agreement author-
izes a member or Council to submit a proposed amendment to the Ministerial
Conference. The Ministerial Conference then decides by consensus whether to
submit the proposed amendment to the WTO membership for acceptance, and
whether the proposed amendment would "alter the rights and obligations of the
Members" (unless the provisions of paragraphs 2, 5, or 6 apply). Unless it speci-
fies a longer time period, the Ministerial Conference has 90 days to render its de-
cision. If it reaches a consensus, it submits the proposed amendment to the WTO
membership. If it fails to reach a consensus during that time, it then decides by a
two-thirds majority whether to submit the proposed amendment to the members
for acceptance. The proposed amendment is presumed to alter the rights and ob-
ligations of the members, unless the Ministerial Conference decides otherwise by
a three-fourths majority.
The Ministerial Conference decided Article 31bis would alter the rights and
obligations of the members. Therefore, paragraph 3 governs the procedure for
acceptance. Accordingly, Article 31bis will take effect for the members that accept
it upon acceptance by two-thirds of the WTO membership. Thereafter, it takes
effect for each other member when that member accepts it. Finally, the Ministerial
Conference may decide by a three-fourths majority that an amendment effective
under paragraph 3 is "of such a nature that any Member which has not accepted it
within a period specified.., shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain
a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference."
35 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
10 J. HEALTH ECON. 107, 132 (1991) ("The average cost of [new chemical entity] de-
velopment was estimated to be $231 million in 1987 dollars .... ). See also Press
Release, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802
Million (Nov. 30, 2001), http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/NewsArti-
cle.asp?newsid=6.
36 See WTO Study, supra note 16, at 42-44 (discussing the effect of the patent
system in promoting the invention, development and marketing of new drugs
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the cost of imitation is low and it is relatively easy for free-riders to
use the knowledge and data created by the original inventor.
In response to the massive investments made by the pharma-
ceutical industry, patent protection has gradually been strength-
ened. Protection is granted for the chemical composition, produc-
tion methods, and the ensuing product, as well as different modes
of application. The protection provided by an issued patent has
also been prolonged, first by generally increasing patent protection
to 20 years after filing and, subsequently, by granting extended
protection for new chemical entities for supplementary periods.37
An important reason for introducing TRIPS was the pressure
from the developed world to secure IP protection in developing
countries. The intention was not primarily to satisfy the pharma-
ceutical industry, but increased protection would, of course, serve
this end as well. The consequences of patent protection on the
pricing of pharmaceuticals in developing countries have been the
subject of economic debate. Scherer has concluded that countries
with stringent patent protection have higher prices.38 In general,
there will be effects if developing countries introduce product pat-
ent protection for pharmaceuticals, 39 but these should not be exag-
gerated. 40
with further references confirming the importance of the patent system for the
pharmaceutical research).
37 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. (L 182) 1 (EC) (concerning
the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products).
The United States and Japan have also introduced similar legislation.
38 F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 112-14 (1993) (arguing that robust patent protection
promotes greater profits since it reduces competition between drug producers).
39 See CARSTEN FINK, How STRONGER PATENT PROTECTION IN INDIA MIGHT
AFFECT THE BEHAVIOR OF TRANSNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 1 (2000)
("The availability of close therapeutic substitute drugs that are not covered by
patent rights can restrain prices and limit consumer welfare losses."); Pablo
Challu, The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, 15 WORLD
COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 65 (1991) (estimating the total public cost that
would be imposed on Argentina by the adoption of a patent system at over $2 bil-
lion); and Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy
Options for India Under the IWTO TRIPS Agreement, 23 WORLD ECON. 733, 747 (2000)
("[P]rices are likely to increase and welfare is likely to decrease, in moving from
current market structure to patent monopoly.").
40 See, e.g., HEINZ REDWOOD, NEW HORIZONS IN INDIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION (1994). According to this study, with or
without patent protection a combination of price control, low purchasing power,
reserve powers under pricing freedom, and therapeutic competition will allow a
confident prediction that there will be no general price explosion in India. Id at 2-
3.
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The original manufacturers concentrate sales efforts on high
priced countries where IP protection is available in order to capital-
ize on investments. Supply to low-priced countries could still be
attractive at the margin, but the risk of product reexportation back
to the high-priced market has been an industry deterrent.
The key question, then, is how the supply of essential medi-
cines to developing countries can be increased. In principle, three
legal alternatives are available:
(1) Most essential pharmaceutical products are not under pat-
ent protection and may already be produced without infringing
any rights;
(2) Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals can be regulated in such a
way to either allow or prevent international trade in IP-protected
products. The issue is whether the international exhaustion prin-
ciple or a more restrictive national or regional solution would bet-
ter serve the interests of the developing world; and
(3) Rules on compulsory licensing can be designed in such a
way as to allow production of IP protected products under specific
conditions.
The patent protection for a pharmaceutical product lasts for a
period of 20 years from the first filing. Of the 300 most essential
medicines listed by the WHO, the absolute majority are outside
patent protection and can be freely produced in developing coun-
tries or in the developed world and sold at competitive prices. The
TRIPS agreement offers no protection for such products, nor does
any national law. In fact, the expired patent will serve as an im-
portant recipe for the generic producer, who can thereby avoid ma-
jor R&D costs. Still, generic production requires substantial know-
how and sufficient investment to secure safe and reliable products.
The "off patent" situation may not apply to HIV/AIDS-
medicines, which are a fairly recent development. They remain
protected to a large extent and production and sale of such medi-
cines will infringe IP rights for some years to come. It is, however,
prudent to investigate countries in which patent protection has
been awarded. Normally patents will only be sought in commer-
cially desirable countries. It is probably not too bold an assump-
tion that the rights-holder normally does not seek protection in the
least-developed countries. Products could accordingly be free for
production and sale in these countries if the technology and the in-
frastructure were available.
An important question has been the extent to which the patent
protection covers non-commercial activities with pharmaceutical
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products. In the United States, the Bolar exemption has applied,
which allows companies to initiate trials with the product during
the time of protection in order to release generic copies promptly
upon expiry of patents. 41 The European position has been more
ambivalent. Whereas Germany has allowed such experimenta-
tion 42, other countries have been reluctant.43
In 1997, the EU pressured Canada under the WTO dispute set-
tlement system to establish that exemptions for clinical trials and
the stock-piling of commercial quantities of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts before patent expiration were in conflict with TRIPS. 44 Canada
referred to TRIPS Article 30, which allows limited exceptions to
patent protection in national law. In March 2000, the WTO dispute
panel agreed that the Canadian law, which allowed clinical trials in
anticipation of future marketing approvals, did not conflict with
the TRIPS Agreement. However, the practice of producing and
stockpiling the product before patent expiration was an unaccept-
able practice.
The combined effects of the above is that under most circum-
stances IP rights will not in themselves create an obstacle to secur-
ing competing products at low prices to either the developed or
developing world. Other factors such as lack of education, basic
technology, and general incentives will hinder capacity building
efforts in the developing world.
One solution to the problem with protected pharmaceuticals
could be to allow parallel trade in IP-protected products, which
have been put on the market either by the rights-holder himself or
with his consent. The converse solution would be to prohibit such
41 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (interpreting the experimental use exemption narrowly to "avoid a vio-
lation of the patent laws in the guise of a 'scientific inquiry"'). Shortly after this
decision the Congress passed legislation, which exempts activities that are "rea-
sonably related" to seeking FDA approval for a generic drug and thereby wid-
ened the scope of the exemptions. Pub. L. No. 98-147, § 202, 98 Stat. 1603 (1984),
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
42 See, Klinishe Versuche (Clinical Trials) I, Bundesgerichsshof [BGH] [Fed-
eral Court of Justice] 1997, 15 R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.). (holding that experimentation
with patented drugs is permitted before they are available generically).
43 Compare, e.g., Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Evans Med. Ltd., 1 F.S.R.
513, 523-24 (Patents Ct. 1989) (U.K.) (holding that such experimentation of pat-
ented pharmaceutical products is not permissible).
44 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Canada - Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/1 (Jan. 12, 1998) (arguing that
Canada's patent protection laws violate their commitment to TRIPS).
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trade and thereby allow original manufacturers to price discrimi-
nate and secure supply to the developing world at lower costs. 45
A general international exhaustion principle would mean that
exhaustion occurs when the rights-holder puts his product on the
market anywhere in the world. Yet such a system would hardly
increase availability of essential products in developing countries.
The problem is not that there are cheap products in the world at
large and expensive products in developing countries. Rather, it is
that developing countries simply cannot afford the normal price
the product commands.46 If low-priced products were available in
developing countries, it appears likely that they would be exported
to developed countries where a premium price could be obtained.
The principle would preempt developing countries of their needs.47
In order to perfect the conditions for differential pricing, devel-
oped markets must be isolated from developing markets. Intellec-
tual property rights are only one legal premise for interdicting the
importation (or reimportation) of low-price pharmaceuticals des-
tined to AIDS-ravaged Third World markets. Yet these alternative
premises, like exhaustion, are discretionary: countries may or may
not make import-exclusion available to pharmaceutical producers.
The signal advantage of using an import-exclusion right linked to
intellectual property is that TRIPS can make the recognition of such
a right mandatory with respect to the broad WTO membership.
The outcome of the recent AIDS pharmaceutical debate is that in-
ternational exhaustion may no longer be discretionary, but rather
mandatory. That is, pharmaceutical producers should be given the
legal right, through IP law or otherwise, to protect high-price mar-
kets from the threat of low-price pharmaceuticals intended for con-
sumption in the developing world.
45 See Press Release, WTO, Experts: Affordable Medicines for Poor Countries
are Feasible (Apr. 11, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
pres01_e/pr220_e.htm (stating that price differentiation was the practical solution
arrived at by a 2001 WTO expert meeting in Norway).
46 But see Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Submission by the Permanent Mission of Brazil, TRIPS and Public Health,
IP/C/W/296 (June 29, 2001), (taking a different position and regarding parallel
trade as "extremely relevant" for developing countries).
47 See A. Bryan Baer, Note, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel
Importation of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 128 (2001) ("Absent price
controls, higher prices for pharmaceuticals in developing nations would be the
necessary result of a new law allowing the parallel importation of pharmaceuti-
cals.").
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2.2. The European Case
The position of the European Union on parallel trade has de-
veloped in case law over three decades. 48 The Treaty of Rome did
not cover IP other than to establish that the rules could be used to
prevent the free movement of goods within the union under Arti-
cle 30 of the European Community Treaty. In line with the excep-
tions in this stipulation, European case law has gradually estab-
lished that national IP rights cannot be used to discriminate or
create disguised restrictions to trade in the single market. Once a
product has been lawfully put on the market anywhere in the
Community, it is subject to free circulation, and any attached na-
tional IP right is extinguished. This judge-made rule49 has subse-
quently been confirmed by legislative enactments both at the EU
and national levels.50
Recently, the European focus has been on whether or not the
exhaustion principle could be extended to the international field.
Again, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has, in a range of
48 See THOMAS HAYS, PARALLEL IMPORTATION UNDER EUROPEAN UNION LAW
(2004) (analyzing parallel importation in Europe by discussing the relevant com-
mon law); HANS HENRIK LIDGARD, PARALLELLHANDEL - KONSUMTION AV
IMMATERIALRkTT I EUROPA OCH USA, (2002); PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (4th ed. 2003) (examining legislative and ju-
dicial developments concerning the provisions in the Treaty of Rome that prohibit
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports among Member States).
49 Compare, e.g., Case 434/85, Allen & Hanburys Ltd. v. Generics (UK) Ltd.,
1988 E.C.R. 1-1245 (holding that a court of a Member State cannot issue an injunc-
tion prohibiting the importation of a product from another state even when such
product is not covered by a parallel patent), Case 187/80, Merck & Co. Inc., v.
Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus Exler, 1981 E.C.R. 1-2063 (extending the holding
in Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc. to situations where the patent holder's prod-
uct has been marketed in another Member State where no patent protection ex-
ists), and Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1-1147 (holding
that the exercise of a national IPR is incompatible with the provisions in the Euro-
pean Economic Community Treaty regarding the free movement of goods within
the Common Market once the patent holder's product has been marketed in an-
other Member State by the patent holder, or with his consent), with Joined Cases
C-267 & C-268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., Beecham Group plc v. Euro-
pharm of Worthing Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, 1997 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996) (finding an
exception to the holding in Merck v. Stephar BV in cases where patent holder was
obliged to market his product or where the product was subject to price control
legislation).
50 See, e.g., Council Directive 98/71, art. 15, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 33 (EU) (promul-
gating a regional exhaustion principle with regards to the legal protection of de-
signs); Council Directive 89/104, art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC), available at
www.wipo.org/clea/docsnew/pdf/en/eu/euOl4en.pdf (promulgating a re-
gional exhaustion principle with regards to the legal protection of trademarks).
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cases, taken a consistent view and confined the principle to internal
application only.51 Only when the physical product 52 has been put
on the European market by the rights-holder or with his express
consent, will exhaustion occur.5 3 When there is doubt as to
whether or not either of these circumstances exists, it is for the
rights-holder to show that the relevant product is imported from a
third country, and for the importer to prove that he has obtained
the rights-holder's consent to the importation.5
4
Nothing prevents an original manufacturer from charging a
high price in the European Union and a low price in a developing
country. He would actually have an incentive to do so, as long as
the price obtained in the latter would cover his marginal cost plus
a slight contribution. The condition is that the producer must be
confident that there will be no reimportation into the high-priced
market. These rules on regional exhaustion have been firmly es-
tablished despite opposition from a number of Member States.55
However controversial this legal development may have been on
51 See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799, 1-4818 (holding that Member States
are precluded from adopting the principle of international exhaustion).
52 See Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. v. G-B Unic SA, 1999 E.C.R. 1-4103, 1-4122
(holding that "the principal of exhaustion concerns only specific goods which
have first been put on the market with the consent of the trade-mark proprietor.").
53 See Joined Cases C-414, C-415 & C-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Im-
ports Ltd., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd, Levis Strauss & Co. v. Costco
Wholesale UK Ltd., 2001 E.C.R. 1-8691, 1-8754 (holding that implied consent can be
inferred, but only if it is expressed positively, and factors taken into consideration
must demonstrate the proprietor's renunciation of intent to enforce his exclusive
rights).
54 See Case C-244/00, Van Doren v. Lifestyle Sports, 2003 E.C.R. 1-3051, 1-
3093-94 (holding that where a third party establishes the existence of a real risk of
"partitioning national markets" if he bears the burden of proof necessary to estab-
lish the existence of conditions for exhaustion, "it is for the proprietor of the
[trademark] to establish that the products were initially placed [outside the Euro-
pean market] ... and for the third party to prove the consent of the [trademark]
proprietor .. "); Council Directive 89/104, supra note 50, art. 7(1), ("[Trademark]
shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have
been put on the market ... under that [trademark] ... with his consent.").
55 See Press Release, Frederick Bolkestein, EU Comm'r, Communiqu6 from
Commissioner Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights, (June
7, 2000) http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/indprop/docs/tm/
comexhaust-en.pdf (recommending against a proposal to change to the Commu-
nity-wide exhaustion regime).
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the regional level, it actually forms a valuable base for the prob-
lems caused by infectious diseases in developing countries.56
That the EU has opted for regional exhaustion allows a rights-
holder in the EU to prevent importation of products that have first
been put on the market in a developing country. This allows
pharmaceutical companies to price differentiate and charge lower
prices in developing countries. Discriminatory as it may sound,
this position has been reinforced by recent Community legislation.
In Europe, the Commission shall, under Article 11 of Regulation
953, continuously monitor the volumes of exports from Europe of
tiered priced products.57 The monitoring is based on information
provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers and exporters for each
tiered priced product, which is to be submitted annually on a con-
fidential basis. The Commission in turn shall periodically report to
the Council. Although Regulation 953 has been in force for only a
short time, considering the intense international debate on price
differentiation, it might be expected that a report would have been
made by now. However, this does not appear to be the case. In
addition, the Commission has an obligation to revise the product
annex of the Regulation every two months and appoint a special
committee to support the Commission in the work under the Regu-
lation. So far, however, only GlaxoSmithKline has been granted
status for certain HIV medicines, 5 8 and there is no indication that
the special committee has been appointed.
It is debatable to what extent a regulation was required to se-
cure protection for rights-holders exporting products to develop-
ing countries. Currently, products destined for export to develop-
ing countries cannot be re-imported to the European Union by a
third party without the consent of the right-holder. Likewise, cus-
toms legislation already provides relief for a rights-holder who is
harmed by illegal importation of its products. Products should be
stopped at the border in order to allow the rights-holder to take le-
56 Cf Baer, supra note 48, at 134 ("While a law allowing for the parallel impor-
tation of drugs may bring benefits to U.S. consumers in the short term, in the long
run, it could have severely negative consequences for consumers in poorer na-
tions ....").
57 Council Regulation 953/2003, art. 11, To Avoid Trade Diversion into the
European Union of Certain Key Medicines, 2003 O.J. (L 135) 5 (EC) [hereinafter
Regulation 9531.
58 See List of Medicines for Which Protection Against Trade Diversion is
Granted Under Regulation 953/2003, available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/cgi-
bin/ antitradediversion/viewMedicines.pl?action=select (last visited Dec. 7, 2006).
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gal action. Accordingly, buying low priced pharmaceuticals in de-
veloping countries and bringing them back to the community is al-
ready prohibited. Sale of these drugs in Europe would often in-
volve trademark infringement59 and probably would also be in
conflict with established rules for the distribution of pharmaceuti-
cals.
Still, the Regulation makes perfect sense. It highlights a prob-
lem and reinforces a prohibition. There can be no doubt about the
state of the law after the Regulation. The general public is made
aware of the problem and enforcing authorities must be prepared
to take action. Customs authorities can be expected to take proac-
tive measures to prevent this importation and they will obtain pre-
cise and better information about potential infringements.
Regulation 953 is expressly intended to be in line with the
WTO/TRIPS undertakings, even if it addresses a different aspect
of the problem than what is achieved with compulsory licensing.
The Regulation will allow the established industry to sell its prod-
ucts at low prices without fearing their reimportation to the devel-
oped world. As a result, the need for compulsory licenses under
the August 30 Agreement should diminish.
2.3. The Case of the United States
U.S. rules on the international exhaustion of patents are not
quite as clear as the rules in Europe. U.S. patent law unambigu-
ously gives a patent holder the ability to block the patented prod-
uct from entering the country.60 This provision establishes a legal
remedy to prohibit the importation of counterfeit or pirated or oth-
erwise unauthorized goods, including generic pharmaceuticals
produced in countries where no patent protection is in force or
where they are produced pursuant to a compulsory license. As is
noted above, many important medicines may be in the public do-
main, due either to expiry of patents or because they were never
covered by patents in the relevant market of production. Any fears
that a U.S. pharmaceutical patent holder may have with respect to
the existence of generics are price effects in export markets; the
patent law provides ample protections to prevent generics from
reaching the U.S. market and destroying the patent monopoly.
59 See discussion of Silhouette, supra note 52.
60 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
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U.S. law is more ambiguous with respect to products produced
by the patent holder or one of its affiliates. There are two fact pat-
terns of concern here. In the first, patented products are manufac-
tured in the United States and then exported. If there are price dif-
ferentials between the U.S. and export markets, there may be
incentives for parallel traders to reimport the patented product into
the United States. This is the so-called "round trip" scenario.
The second scenario involves the production outside the
United States of the patented product, either by an affiliate of the
U.S. patent holder or by a manufacturing licensee. Note that the
U.S. patent holder may well be a non-U.S. entity; major European
and Japanese pharmaceutical firms own valuable U.S. patents and
enjoy profitable returns from their access to the U.S. market. In
this scenario there is often significant U.S. production intended to
service the U.S. market. The presence of an identical imported
product creates a quintessential "gray market" where U.S. prices
are higher (as they typically are in pharmaceuticals) than are prices
where the foreign product is sold.
There is no clear case law covering these two scenarios. The
U.S. Supreme Court has issued several important decisions on the
use of copyrights and trademarks to combat parallel trade, but be-
cause each form of intellectual property right in the United States
depends on distinct statutory foundations, it is unclear how predic-
tive the holdings in these cases can be with respect to the potential
exhaustion of patents.
The 1998 copyright case, Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza
Research International,61 found that a U.S. copyright holder may not
block reimportation, in a round-trip scenario, of copyrighted ex-
pression that was "lawfully made under [the Copyright Act],"
62
that is, copyrighted product created in the United States. How-
ever, the court suggests that in the more typical "gray market" sce-
nario, where copies are produced outside the United States, a right
61 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998). For further discussion of Quality King, see Janice Mueller & Jeffery Atik,
New International Dimensions in the Gray Market Goods Debate, 1 JMLS CENTER FOR
INTELL. PROP. L. NEws SOURCE 6 (1999).
62 See also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1999) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the author-
ity of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord .... ").
1065
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
to block imports might be obtained. 63 Quality King is based on a
close reading of the Copyright Act, which specifically incorporates
the "first sale doctrine" -the U.S. correspondent to the exhaustion
principle. The Patent Act, however, has a markedly different statu-
tory structure than the Copyright Act. Indeed, there is no ex-
pressed "first sale doctrine" in the text of the Patent Act (the "first
sale doctrine" is rather a creature of judicial decision in U.S. patent
law). As such, one cannot predict that the courts would follow the
reasoning of Quality King in examining similar questions under
U.S. patent law.
In contrast with copyright law, where there is likely no exhaus-
tion occasioned by a first sale outside the United States of copies
made outside the United States, U.S. trademark law appears to
embrace international exhaustion, at least when the foreign manu-
factured goods are produced by an affiliate of the trademark
owner. In its 1988 trademark decision, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.,64 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a long-standing Customs
regulation that exempted from import prohibition goods bearing a
U.S. trademark that were produced by a firm under "common con-
trol" with the U.S. trademark owner. Thus, where a U.S. firm pro-
duces a trademarked product outside the United States, it may not
use its trademark to block importation. Nor may a foreign firm in-
corporate a U.S. distribution subsidiary, transfer the U.S. trade-
mark to the subsidiary, and then use the U.S. trademark to block
parallel importation of its products. However, off-shore sales of
foreign manufactured trademarked goods produced by a third-
party licensee do not exhaust the U.S. trademark and may be
blocked. And, in an important qualification to the K Mart holding,
where the foreign-produced trademarked good is different in a
technical way from the competing U.S. good, the foreign good may
be prohibited under a traditional consumer disappointment the-
ory.
6 5
Round-trip importation of trademarked goods is unproblem-
atic under U.S. trademark law. The portion of U.S. trademark law
63 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 155 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing that
the Court's decision did not address cases in which the products in question were
foreign-produced).
64 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
65 See Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding Section 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, bars foreign goods bear-
ing a trademark identical to a valid U.S. trademark but physically different with-
out regard to affiliation between the producing firms).
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establishing a right of trademark owners to control importation
(the Genuine Goods Exclusion Act 66) only covers "merchandise of
foreign manufacture." In the case of round-trip trade, the goods are
ipso facto of American manufacture and as such are not subject to
the statute's reach.
Thus, in the "round trip" scenario, neither copyright nor
trademark law can be used to block importation. With respect to
parallel trade of goods produced outside the United States, copy-
right seems to permit exclusion, while trademark would allow im-
portation in the common instance where the trademark owner is
under "common control" with the manufacturer of the trade-
marked good. In this "gray market" scenario one might observe
that U.S. copyright law provides for national exhaustion (via the
first sale doctrine), but not international exhaustion; whereas U.S.
trademark principles seem to admit international exhaustion as
well as national exhaustion in the common-control situation.
As discussed above, the treatment of patent law on this subject
is less clear given the absence of an authoritative clarification by
the Supreme Court. There is clearly national exhaustion of patents:
an owner of a patented good purchased in the United States is free
to re-sell the good, free of any claim by the patent holder. How-
ever, the "first-sale doctrine" in U.S. patent law is a court-created
gloss; 67 there is no statutory exception to a U.S. patent holder's ba-
sic right "to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States .... "68 Because the "first-sale doc-
trine" is without statutory grounding, it is difficult to resolve
whether the doctrine operates merely as an exception to the exclu-
sive right to sell, or whether it also embraces the exclusive right to
66 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2000). The law prohibits the importation
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corpo-
ration or association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in
the United States... , unless written consent of the owner of such trade-
mark is produced at the time of making entry.
Id.
67 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (17 Wall. 1873); United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (explaining that when a patentee sells chattel
article passes without the limit[s] of the monopoly). See PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS 1118-41 (Chisum et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001); see also
JANICE MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 362-63 (2003).
68 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
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import. Whether exists international exhaustion of the U.S. patent
depends on whether the import exclusion right is subject to a
"first-sale." There would then be subsequent inquiries into
whether relevant that the first sale occurred in the United States or
abroad; and further, whether it is relevant that the patent holder,
its affiliate, or a third-party licensee manufactures the patented
product. On all these points, there is considerable uncertainty.
It had long been thought that international exhaustion applied
with respect to U.S. patents. In Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v.
United Aircraft Engineering Corp., the Second Circuit held that a U.S.
patent holder could not impede the importation of airplanes pro-
duced in Canada by the assignee of Canadian patent rights. 69 In so
holding, the Second Circuit relied on the old case, Adams v. Burke,70
which held that a purchaser of a patented item takes possession of
the item clear of any territorial limits of the patent monopoly.
The Federal Circuit recently cast doubt on the Curtiss view that
U.S. patents are subject to international exhaustion. In Jazz Photo
Corp. v. International Trade Commission,71 the Federal Circuit made
clear that exhaustion applies only to goods first sold in the United
States; goods first sold outside the United States are still subject to
the patent holder's right to exclude. The language in Jazz Photo is
fairly emphatic: "United States patent rights are not exhausted by
products of foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of the
first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred un-
der the United States patent."72
Jazz Photo addresses the repair/reconstruction distinction with
respect to patented single-use cameras. The Federal Circuit held
that the patentee could not block the importation of single-use
cameras that had been first sold within the United States and then
"repaired" (and thus restored to usefulness) outside the United
States -i.e., cameras making a round-trip. The portion of the deci-
sion discussed above addressed the case of any "repaired" camera
69 Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71,
78 (2d Cir. 1920) ("The purchaser of a patented article from a territorial licen-
see... may, unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary, use the article so
purchased outside of the territory without interference from the patentee.").
70 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (17 Wall. 1873) ("[W]e hold that in the
class of machines or implements we have described, when they are once lawfully
made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for the benefit of
the patentee .. ").
71 Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
72 Id. at 1105.
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shells that had never been sold in the United States. Because the
vacated underlying ITC order seemed to not make any distinction
between where the cameras were first sold, the views expressed
above do not seem to form part of the core holding. Moreover,
there is virtually no discussion (notwithstanding the self-assured
tone of the court's statement that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S.
patents) other than a citation to Boesch v. Graft, an opaque case in-
volving goods produced and sold abroad, not by a patentee, but
rather by a rival German manufacturer utilizing a prior use right.
Additional opinions in the dispute, however, clarified that exhaus-
tion only applied to those originating in the United States-as to
foreign-sourced camera shells, the patent holder could block im-
portation.7
3
3. NON-PATENT RESTRAINTS ON PARALLEL TRADE IN
PHARMACEUTICALS
3.1. European Restraints
In early 2001, the EC Commission issued a communication sug-
gesting action in the form of a global tiered pricing system for es-
sential pharmaceuticals. Products included in the communication
were for the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. The objective of this plan was to provide
the least-developed countries with access to these medicines, yet
avoid trade diversion of products back to the European market.
The Commission received prompt, full support for the pro-
posed action, both from the Council and Parliament. Despite the
urgency, however, it took two more years to enact binding regula-
tion. The ongoing parallel discussion in WTO perhaps partly ex-
plains the delay, but equally plausible is the general lag in enacting
final legislation in the Community.
On May 26, 2003 the Council issued Regulation 953/2003 to
avoid trade diversion into the European Union of certain key
medicines. 74 Regulation 953 became effective shortly thereafter, on
June 4, 2003.
According to Regulation 953, a producer who is prepared to
sell pharmaceuticals at a low price must differentiate the appear-
73 Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
74 Regulation 953, supra note 57.
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ance of these products from ordinary sales in order to make them
identifiable for the customs authorities;75 an application shall be
made to the Commission to have the product included in a list of
protected products; and the application shall indicate the name of
the product, active ingredient and indications as to use, the price of
the product, country of destination, customs nomenclature and dis-
tinguishing features. 76
The Commission will promptly verify that the application is in
conformity with the Regulation; a low price is of prime impor-
tance.77 Article 3 of Regulation 953 provides two options for set-
ting the price. It can either amount to 25% of the weighted average
multiplied by the factory price charged in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development markets, or the manu-
facturer's direct production costs plus 15%.78 These percentages
are established in separate annexes, suggesting that they may be
subject to future review. If the manufacturer so prefers, he can
provide a certificate issued by an approved auditor, establishing
that the price corresponds to the Regulation. 79
Regulation 953 is only valid for products related to the preven-
tion, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. An-
nex IV adds "related opportunistic diseases," which presumably is
not intended to extend the reach of the Regulation to other syn-
dromes and especially not to prevailing life-style diseases pres-
ently attracting much attention in the Western world.8 0 In line with
the general practice of customs authorities, the Regulation does not
apply to non-commercial goods contained in travellers' personal
luggage for use within the limits laid down in respect of relief from
customs duty. The limit is in the range of 150 euro.81 Nothing in
the Regulation indicates that protection should only be available
75 Id. at 5.
76 Id. art. 4.
77 Id. art. 4.
78 Id. art. 3.
79 Id. art. 4.
80 Id. Annex IV.
81 See Council Regulation 3295/94, Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the
Release for Free Circulation, Export, Re-export, or Entry for a Suspensive Proce-
dure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1994 O.J. (L 341) 8 (EC), amended by Coun-
cil Regulation 241/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 27) 1 (EC) (setting out customs regulation
whereby goods that infringe a patent or a supplementary protection certificate are
included in the categories of goods subject to prohibition and action by customs
authorities).
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for products with an EU origin. It should, in a non-discriminatory
fashion, also be available to third-country products, provided they
are reported under the Regulation.
The country of destination must be one included in the list in
Annex II of the Regulation. The list covers seventy-six poorer Afri-
can, Latin American, and Asian countries. It includes, of course,
not only the least-developed countries of the world, but also de-
veloping countries like India, China, and certain Russian repub-
lics. 82 Destination countries have the lowest per-capita income and
are all countries where HIV/AIDS is particularly prevalent. The
Commission has indicated that the number of countries may be ex-
tended at a later date.
83
The product should be distinguished from ordinary high-
priced products supplied in the developed world. Normally this
will mean that the packaging must have a different appearance,
but it also logically follows from the Regulation that the medicine
have a different form or color in order to be easily distinguished
from the ordinary product. In addition, the manufacturer shall
mark the product with a logo, which has been designed specifically
for purposes of the Regulation. 84 A photo of the product must be
submitted together with the application.
The fundamental purpose of Regulation 953 is to secure that
products, which have been sold at a significantly reduced price in
developing countries, should not return to the European Union.
Therefore, Article 2 provides that " [i] t shall be prohibited to import
into the Community tiered priced products for the purposes of re-
lease for free circulation, re-export, placing under suspensive pro-
cedures or placing in a free zone or free warehouse."85 The Regula-
tion does not state the consequences of infringing the prohibition.
The matter seems to be left to national law, unless future imple-
menting provisions are enacted by the EC Commission.8 6
82 Regulation 953, supra note 57, Annex II.
83 See Council Regulation 953/2003 Frequently Asked Questions, http://
trade-info.cec.eu.int/cgi-bin/antitradediversion/ index.pl?action=faq (last visited
Dec. 7, 2006).
84 Regulation 953, supra note 57, art. 7.
85 Id.
86 Implementing measures should be adopted in accordance with Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999, which lays down procedures for the exer-
cise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 1987 O.J. (L 256) 1,
amended by Commission Regulation 2176/2002/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 331) 3.
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The Regulation appears as a lex specialis, but clearly indicates
that it is not intended to interfere with intellectual property rights
or the rights of intellectual property owners; nor shall it in any way
prejudice the application of community legislation on proprietary
medicines.8
7
Rather than contributing to potential infringements of intellec-
tual property rights, the new legislation reinforces the rights of the
proprietor in line with general EU developments on exhaustion of
IPR, and yet has the intention to secure easier access to medicines
for developing countries.
The question remains whether the legislation supports a solu-
tion to the HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries or only sup-
ports IP right holders in the Community. Furthermore, it begs the
question of whether these measures are in line with the subsequent
WTO efforts to find a global solution to the supply of essential
medicines in poor countries and whether the regulation is com-
patible with prevailing IP principles.
Under the regional principle, as discussed earlier, it could be
argued that no further legislative measures were required. In
situations where the rights-holder produces the product in the EU
and thereafter exports and sells it to developing countries, the ex-
haustion principle would not be applicable and reimportation into
the Community would be an infringement of existing IP rights.
The rights-holder can require support from national customs au-
thorities to prevent such products from being introduced into
European commerce.
However, the Regulation explains that even if regulatory in-
struments are in place, "these instruments risk becoming insuffi-
cient where substantial volumes of heavily discounted pharmaceu-
ticals are sold to the poorest developing country markets and the
economic interest in trade diversion into high priced markets
87 According to Article 12 of the Regulation:
The application of this Regulation shall in no circumstances interfere
with procedures laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community
code relating to medicinal products for human use [2001 O.J. (L 311) 67,
amended by Directive 2002/98, 2003 O.J. (L 33) 30 (EC)] and Council Regu-
lation 2309/93/EEC of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures
for the authori[z]ation and supervision of medicinal products for human
and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evalua-
tion of Medicinal Products [1993 O.J. (L 214) 1, amended by Commission
Regulation 649/98, 1998 O.J. (L 88) 7 (EC)].
Regulation 953, supra note 57, art. 12.
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therefore may increase significantly."8 8 Special measures were re-
quired to counteract the substantial economic interest that could
otherwise be enticed.
Producers should always be encouraged to make products eas-
ily available at low prices and therefore Community law must en-
sure that exported products remain in the country of destination.
Likewise, donated products and products sold under competitive
tenders also qualify under the Regulation.
8 9
The question remains -to what type of infringement would an
importation of a protected product amount? Is it a regular crime, a
breach of general customs legislation, or should it be regarded as
an unlawful infringement of IP rights? Time will tell. If it is re-
garded as an infringement of IP rights, most national legislation in-
cludes imprisonment as a penalty for grave contraventions. Al-
though rarely used, this remedy seems appropriate in this instance.
Exempted from the reimportation prohibition are: (a) re-export
to countries of destination; and (b) placing the protected product
"under a transit or customs warehouse procedure or in a free zone
or free warehouse, for the purpose of re-export to a country of des-
tination." 90 These exemptions appear odd. It is unlikely that the
original exporter sold the product to a developed country, and
then someone else returned it to Europe with the intent to sell it to
the original country of destination. Nor does it seem likely that the
exemption is intended to protect products from third countries
passing through the European Union. No explanatory memoran-
dum sheds further light on this stipulation.
As with products infringing on IP rights, the primary control of
tiered priced products will be carried out by the national customs
authorities. The customs authorities shall suspend the release of,
or detain, a potentially infringing product if there is sufficient in-
formation to consider the product in question a tiered priced prod-
uct.91
Customs shall inform both the "competent authority" in the
Member State and the manufacturer of the suspension or the de-
tention of the product. This notion, too, is left to the Member
States to substantiate. The Regulation only clarifies that the au-
thority shall determine whether the relevant goods are tiered
88 Id. pmbl., 6.
89 Id. pmbl.
90 Id. art. 2(2).
91 Id. art. 8.
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priced products and gives instructions based on the outcome of the
review.92
The absence of a specific definition could allow for the assump-
tion that "competent authority" includes a court competent in cus-
toms matters; this again would make the procedure parallel with
that of IP rights. On the other hand, the period of suspension or
detention is very brief -normally it shall not exceed ten working
days. This does not allow for any detailed legal scrutiny. The
hastiness of the procedure suggests that the competent authority
may be a governmental agency. If so, it appears imperative that
the procedure still allow for ordinary legal activities in an IP in-
fringement procedure. Should the rights-holder wish to instigate a
civil procedure, he must be entitled to do so under ordinary rules
and the Regulation cannot pre-empt this possibility. The Regula-
tion provides that upon expiration of the ten-day period, the prod-
ucts shall be released, provided that all customs formalities have
been satisfied. 93 The latter reference must open the way for ordi-
nary civil procedures.
In contrast to the infringement procedure, which is normally
carried out at the expense of the rights-holder, this procedure is
carried out at the expense of the importer. The Regulation does
not alter this fact in cases where the products are later released to
the market, after scrutiny by the competent authority. 94
If the products are tiered priced products, they shall be seized
and disposed of in accordance with national legislation. Again, the
procedure is carried out at the expense of the importer. Interest-
ingly, the preamble mentions that seized products may be dis-
posed of to the benefit of the developing countries should it be
possible under national law, and only in the absence of such possi-
bility should the products be destroyed.95 This stipulation does not
reappear in the operative part of the text and therefore has primar-
ily a guiding force.
3.2. U.S. Restraints
In the case of importation (or reimportation) of pharmaceuti-
cals into the United States, the ambiguities in patent exhaustion
92 Id.
93 Id. art. 8(1).
94 Id. art. 9.
95 Id. pmbl. 14.
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may have limited relevance. The importation of pharmaceuticals is
independently restricted by features of the U.S. pharmaceutical
regulatory regime. All prescription pharmaceuticals that "move"
in interstate commerce (which includes importation into the
United States) must have a New Drug Application ("NDA") ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").96 As
NDAs apply to the source of a pharmaceutical (and involve manu-
facturing oversight), the existence of an NDA for a drug produced
in the United States does not relieve the obligation to obtain an
NDA for the identical drug produced in a foreign facility -
whether by a generic producer, a compulsory licensee, or a third-
party licensee of the U.S. patent holder.
The only situation where the absence of an NDA would not be
problematic is in a true round-trip: a pharmaceutical produced in
the United States under an NDA, exported for sale abroad, and
then reimported. Even in this case, the importer may be asked to
demonstrate that the imported pharmaceutical has not been adul-
terated or misbranded. After a spate of counterfeit importations in
the 1980s, Congress amended the federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act to prohibit the importation of prescription drugs made in
the United States by anyone other than the manufacturer. 97 Under
current law, therefore, only the manufacturer can lawfully com-
plete a "round-trip" importation.
Thus, non-U.S.-origin pharmaceuticals are effectively prohib-
ited without an NDA, except of course where the manufacturer re-
imports the good. There are no formal exceptions to these prohibi-
tions, though as a matter of enforcement policy the FDA had per-
mitted importation for personal use. This enforcement policy by
its terms applies principally to pharmaceuticals treating conditions
that have no effective treatment in the United States. 98 By implica-
tion then, any pharmaceutical available in the United States may
not be imported under the personal use exception. Of course, the
personal use exception is broader in practice than the FDA proce-
dures suggest, as many U.S. senior citizens regularly visit pharma-
cies in Canada and Mexico and return to the United States with
personal supplies of prescription drugs.
96 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (2000)
97 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2000).
98 See FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual, Ch. 9, available at http://www.
fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/rpm-new2/ch9pers.html (analyzing policies cur-
rently being reviewed).
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Under current regulatory conditions, it is unlikely that signifi-
cant parallel trade in pharmaceuticals will develop in the United
States. HIV/AIDS drugs provided at low-cost to developing coun-
tries are unlikely to cycle into the United States, which would un-
dercut high U.S. prices while denying the intended beneficiaries
access to these medicines.
4. CONCLUSION
New TRIPS Article 31bis marks a significant change in the
overall "outlook" of TRIPS. Through its express endorsement of
"anti-diversion measures," it moves TRIPS from its declared "neu-
trality" on parallel trade (as expressed in TRIPS Article 6) to a posi-
tion supporting the mandatory suppression of parallel trade. It
remains to be seen whether this move is lex specialis- that is, appli-
cable only to pharmaceuticals (or perhaps only to those pharma-
ceuticals produced and distributed in response to conditions that
would justify compulsory licenses under Article 31 and 31bis)- or
whether it reflects an overall shift. Viewing Article 31bis as a spe-
cial rule acknowledges the abandonment of another primary TRIPS
principle: neutrality to the technology field.99 If the mandatory
suppression of parallel trade grows into a general rule, exercise of
exclusionary rights by IP-holders will lead to a world with fewer
trade barriers.
That said, these doctrinal shifts do contribute to improving the
condition of millions of people currently suffering from HIV/AIDS
in LDCs. Pharmaceutical firms may supply these markets at low
prices without exposing themselves to back-flow that would un-
dercut higher prices in developed markets (thus maintaining their
incentives to develop increasingly effective medicines). Or, rather,
these companies may no longer use the specter of unfair competi-
tion from diverted products to justify ignoring the needs of the af-
flicted.
99 Article 27 of TRIPS provides that patents shall be available for any inven-
tions "in all fields of technology." TRIPS art. 27.
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